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Abstract
In this paper, I use the case of elite Chinese financial mobility to London’s financial
district to argue that comparatively neglected forms of elite financial migration from
beyond the Global North provide important insights into the changing geographical
form, and labour market practices within, leading international financial centres. By
reporting on original empirical research, two main findings emerge. First, Chinese
financial mobility to London has a distinctive geographical footprint in terms of both
financial services activity and residential choices. Second, the rationale behind elite
Chinese financial mobility to London cannot be fully explained by existing work on
highly skilled migration and expatriation that emphasises the economic imperatives
driving mobility. In response, I argue that work on elite mobility requires a fuller
engagement with wider debates in economic geography that examine the inter-
dependencies and inter-relationships between states and markets. These findings
raise important questions surrounding the durability of Chinese finance in London,
its relationship to global finance in London more generally, and wider
understandings of elite financial labour markets.
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Introduction
The international mobility of financial elites has attracted growing academic, popular
and political attention in recent years (see, for example, The Financial Times, 2016).
Research in this area emphasises how such mobilities shape the flows of knowledge
and expertise through which international financial centres (IFCs) are reproduced
(Beaverstock, 1996; Beaverstock and Hall, 2012; Sassen, 2000; Thrift 1994). This
work builds on, and contributes to, a wider literature on elite, or what Kunz (2016)
terms ‘privileged mobilities’ (see also Sklair, 2001; Smith, 2001). However, the
geographical focus of this work remains limited. Studies typically focus on flows of
migrants either between IFCs in Europe and North America (Beaverstock, 2005; Ryan
and Mulholland, 2014) or on the mobility of individuals from the Global North to
rapidly growing economies, often in Asia and the Middle East (Beaverstock, 2002).
As a result, little is known about what happens to theoretical understandings of the
rationale behind, and implications of, international mobility when different
geographies of mobility are in play (although for exceptions see Knowles 2017;
Moore, 2016).
In response, and inspired by calls to take the urban dimensions of mobility seriously
(Smith, 2001), this paper reports on original research conducted into flows of
Chinese financiers from mainland China to London. This empirical focus is significant
for two reasons. First, figures show that Chinese born nationals now make up the
3largest source of migrants to the UK (Dominiczak, 2013) and yet understandings of
Chinese migration to the UK remain largely rooted in earlier waves of immigration
that were characterised by migrants working in lower paid service sector jobs,
particularly the restaurant and food trade (Knowles, 2017, Pieke, 2007). Second,
demand for elite Chinese financial labour in London has grown significantly since
2012, following London’s development as a leading western centre for the
internationalisation of China’s currency, the renminbi (RMB) (Hall, 2017a; Hall,
2017b; Töpfer and Hall, 2017).
By reporting on findings relating to the motivations, experiences and future planned
trajectories of Chinese financiers in London, two main findings emerge. First,
Chinese financial migration into London has a distinctive geographical footprint in
terms of both financial services activity and the residential choices of Chinese. This
points to the emerging, ways in which Chinese finance is beginning to shape
London’s wider economy. This is not limited to the financial services activity at the
heart of RMB internationalisation but, also extends to Chinese investment in London
real estate and the significance of Chinese retail spending in the development of
luxury consumption practices in London (on which see Atkinson et al, 2017 and JLL,
2015 respectively).
Second, the rationale behind elite Chinese financial mobility in London does not sit
neatly within existing understandings of elite mobility and expatriation that
emphasise the economic rationales underpinning such mobility, particularly at the
firm level (see Beaverstock, 2004 for example). Whilst my analysis shows that for
4some financiers, their motivations for working in London were underpinned by
economic motives that dominate existing theoretical explanations of elite migration,
political motives also need to be more fully theorised than has been hitherto the
case. In this sense, the work and mobility of Chinese financial elites was closely tied
into the Chinese state project aimed at having strategically important IFCs such as
London tied into the RMB internationalisation process (see also Töpfer and Hall,
2017). This finding suggests that work on elite migration could usefully draw on
wider debates in economic geography that seek to understand the inter-
dependencies and inter-relationship between states and markets (see O’Neill, 2008
for example) as the Chinese and UK state facilitate Chinese elite migration to London
and in turn this migration supports wider state policies relating to both RMB
internationalisation and the wider competitiveness of London as an IFC. Taken
together, these findings raise important questions concerning the future trajectory
of Chinese elite migration to London as well as broader points concerning London’s
future development as an IFC following the referendum vote to leave the EU by the
UK in June 2016 (Hall and Wójick, 2018).
I develop these arguments over four sections. Next I locate the mobility and
expatriation of Chinese financiers within the wider literatures on elite migration and
expatriation in general, and Chinese mobility into London in particular. I then reveal
the geographies of Chinese finance and financiers in London, revealing how Chinese
financial elites, and the financial institutions they work for, are concentrated in the
historic centre of London’s financial district and inner London boroughs with
important consequences for the relationship between Chinese financial elites and
5elite labour markets more generally in London. In the next substantive section, I
explore the different routes by which these geographies have been created through
Chinese elite migration and expatriation into London. Here, I examine how Chinese
financial elites in London are typically at an earlier career stage than elites from
Europe and North America that have been more widely studied. This career stage
reveals close links between educational background and elite Chinese mobility in
ways that trouble assumptions of a relatively seamless transition from selected
higher education institutions and elite financial labour markets. I conclude by
reflecting on the implications of these findings for understandings of labour market
mobility in global finance in general, and the reproduction of London as an
international financial centre in particular.
Mobility and international financial centres: the case of elite Chinese urban
economies
My analysis of the mobility of Chinese financiers into London takes as its starting
point the growing academic interest in highly skilled labour between nation states
over the least twenty-five years (see for example Iredale, 2001; Koser and Salt,
1997). Much of the early research in this area focused on the mobility of individuals
with higher educational qualifications within the transnational corporations they
worked for (Findlay et al 1996). The geographical focus of this work on mobility was
dominated by migration from and between global cities within advanced economies
(Sassen, 2000). For example, work on inter-company transferees, particularly in its
earliest phases, emphasised the ways in which individuals from Europe and North
6America especially were sent by their employers as expatriates to newly opened
offices in rapidly growing economies in order to ensure that similar standards of
service were maintained in newly opened offices as compared to the firm’s
headquarters (Beaverstock, 2004).
Building on this early work, research increasingly began to interrogate who counted
as a highly skilled migrant by studying more closely the types of assignments being
undertaken by migrants, and the geographies associated with these (Findlay and
Cranston, 2015). Reflecting this questioning of the term ‘highly skilled’, as well as a
desire to acknowledge the privileged economic and political position of the Chinese
nationals involved in this research, I use the term elite mobility rather than highly
skilled migrant in my analysis (see Savage and Williams, 2008 for a wider discussion
of the importance of studying elites within the contemporary global economy).
Research also began to move beyond mobility driven through inter-firm transfers to
examine the mobility of the self-employed and entrepreneurs (Saxenian, 2006; Ley,
2010). This change in focus brought with it a greater attention to understanding the
rationale for mobility moving beyond a focus on disseminating best practice from
the headquarters of transnational corporations typically through flows of migrants
from the Global North. Rather, research became increasingly concerned with
understanding the ways in which migration can be used to foster economic
development and innovation within mature economies (Faulconbridge et al, 2009),
often raising concerns about a potential loss of ‘talent’ in their home economies
(Saxenian, 2006; Florida, 2007).
7However, in the case of financial services, the geographical imaginations of work on
elite migration have not widely embraced the more heterodox geographies of this
work on migration and expatriation from beyond the Global North. Typically,
research has focused on the heartlands of global finance through research into the
nature of financial centres in Western Europe and North America, or on the
circulation of elites from these leading financial centres to other spaces of global
finance through processes such as expatriation (Beaverstock, 2002, 2005). This
builds on a wider understanding in academic and policy circles that has frequently
identified a ready supply of graduate labour as a key factor in explaining the
competitiveness of leading financial centres (Beaverstock and Hall, 2012; Z/Yen,
2016). However, as Robinson (2002, 2005) has argued, much of this work is
characterised by a distinctive geographical focus on the mobility of elites from the
Global North to other parts of the world. As a result, much less attention has been
paid to financial elites beyond Western Europe and North America, their mobility
patterns and working practices (although see Bassens et al, 2011, 2010; Lai, 2012;
Krijnen et al, 2017 and Kleibert and Kippers, 2016).
Reframing elite mobility between financial centres
The case of Chinese migration into London, therefore, raises important questions
about how well our existing understandings of the motivations, experiences and
trajectories of migration within the financial services sector can explain elite Chinese
mobility into London and its role in IFC formation and reproduction. Addressing
these concerns is also important in terms of updating understandings of Chinese
8migration to London, and the UK more generally, that remain largely rooted in more
historic migration flows of Chinese nationals working in lower paid service and
hospitality sectors. In this respect, it is important to locate the forms of mobility
studied in this paper within the wider transformation of Chinese migration from a
process that was only permitted from Hong Kong and other overseas Chinese
territories, to one open to a far wider segment of the Chinese population,
particularly the rapidly growing Chinese middle class and young people undertaking
mobility for studying (Pieke, 2007).
After the Second World War, the People’s Republic of China (PRC) effectively banned
all official emigration until the 1960s (Pieke, 2007). As a result, there were only
modest international migration flows from Hong Kong and Taiwan to the UK,
reflecting their unique political status as overseas territories. In contrast to the
Chinese migrants who form the basis of this paper, in terms of occupation, this
migration stream to the UK was characterised by individuals working in relatively low
paid, service sector jobs, particularly in the catering sector (see Findlay and Li, 1998).
This pattern of migration changed from the 1980s onwards as the PRC began to relax
the regulations surrounding migration. Following this, migration became an option
for Chinese citizens from mainland China who could demonstrate they could
legitimately enter a foreign country (Xiang, 2003). As a result, two migration flows
from mainland China to the UK can be identified from the 1980s onwards as part of
what Pieke (2007) terms the ‘new Chinese migration order’.
9First, Chinese elite migration grew significantly from the 1990s onwards, reflecting
the wider opening up of the Chinese economy associated with domestic economic
reform. As a result, an increasingly entrepreneurial elite Chinese middle class
emerged in China, for whom international migration represented a significant
economic and cultural opportunity (Tomba, 2004). Work on the resulting diaspora
of skilled Chinese migrants has cautioned against simply inserting this group of
migrants into existing frameworks for understanding elite migration. For example,
Saxenian’s (2006) seminal analysis of the role of migration from China (amongst
other countries) in the labour markets of Silicon Valley recasts this migratory flow
away from understandings of an engineering brain drain from China and instead
develops understandings of brain circulation as Chinese migrants return to China,
and in so doing shape economic growth in China and Silicon Valley (see also Ong,
1999).
Second, building on a more established history of migration from the 1960s onwards
from Hong Kong to the UK for educational purposes, significant research attention
has been paid to the growth of education related migration from mainland China
from the 1990s onwards (Waters, 2006). Again, political economic changes within
China are important for understanding the growth and transformation of this form
of migration. The rise of a Chinese middle class alongside Chinese entrepreneurs has
increased the number of Chinese households who are able to afford foreign
education for their children. This has expanded beyond a preference for
postgraduate education, largely in North America in the 1990s (Pieke, 2007) to
include undergraduate degrees, compulsory schooling and short-term English
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language courses in a more diverse range of geographical locations, particularly in
the UK and western Europe (Bohm et al, 2004).
Taken together, this work is important in revealing the particular political, economic
and cultural contexts shaping contemporary forms of elite Chinese migration.
However, less attention has been paid to the migration of Chinese born nationals
into financial and related professional services, and it is this that I address in the rest
of this paper.
Methods
The paper draws on two main strands of research. The first seeks to quantify and
document the spatiality of elite Chinese financial migration in London. This
seemingly straightforward task becomes more challenging given the acknowledged
difficulty of obtaining accurate data on elite migration to the UK more generally,
particularly in terms of the nationality of migrants (Findlay and Gould 1989). As a
result, it is difficult to use official data sources to disaggregate the number of
Chinese migrants working in London by sector. For example, because the UK census
is only conducted every 10 years with the last one being held in 2011, the recent
impact of RMB internationalisation on Chinese migration to the UK from 2012
onwards is not picked up in census data. In order to overcome the temporal
limitations of other forms of migration data, my research draws on an analysis of
new national insurance registrations by adult overseas nationals entering the UK by
year of registration. This data is provided by the Department for Work and Pensions
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and has the advantage of being updated annually. A National Insurance (NI) number
is needed to pay tax in the UK and hence captures economically active migrants and
can be located geographically within London. However, it is not disaggregated by
sector so inferences have to be made based on the location of migrants in order to
estimate the sectors in which they work.
Therefore, in order to better understand the motivations behind the migration
patterns shown in quantitative data, the second methodology used in my research
are semi-structured interviews with Chinese migrants working in London’s financial
district. This method also posed important methodological issues including securing
access and the situated nature of the knowledge produced, both of which have been
well documented in relation to elite corporate interview more generally (see
Schoenberger, 1991, 1992, and McDowell, 1992 in general and McDowell 1998 on
the case of financial elites in particular). I used several strategies to access
individuals in order to undertake thirty interviews between September 2014 and
June 2015 with Chinese financiers working in a range of RMB denominated financial
markets in London. Conventional ways of accessing financial elites do not work in
the case of Chinese migrants working in financial services in London. For example,
typically the more senior employees within financial organisations can be accessed
via their firm’s corporate website. However, the overwhelming majority of the
migrants I interviewed were at an early career stage (twenty five out of thirty) and
hence did not appear on lists of companies managing boards. Meanwhile, the
websites of Chinese financial institutions operating in London’s financial district,
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particularly the state owned commercial banks, remain rudimentary in nature and
do not contain staff names and contact details.
In response, I used the business orientated social network LinkedIn.com as my
primary way of accessing initial research participants. Through my own LinkedIn
account, I searched for individuals working in the state owned commercial Chinese
banks operating in London, setting out the details of my research and asking if they
would be prepared to meet for an interview. Given the unsolicited nature of my
enquiry, I was expecting a very low success rate. However, to my surprise this
proved very productive and I secured interviews with individuals working at different
levels within these banks. During the interview, I asked why they had been keen to
participate. The value placed on the cultural capital associated with education
amongst Chinese migrants (Waters, 2005) and my own position as a university
professor at a larger UK higher education institutions with operations in China
emerged as key factors in them agreeing to the interview (this echoes McDowell’s
[1998] discussion of how her own career trajectory facilitated research entry into
London in the late 1990s). It also became apparent that as a female researcher, my
interviewees positioned me as an outsider, as they themselves felt, within London’s
financial district. So, whilst, they understood my position as being different from the
dominant masculine subjectivities of the City, they felt they shared with me a sense
of being ‘other’ through their position within a relatively small elite migrant group,
and this was frequently used in their responses to my questions. This experience
builds on the wider feminist literature on the intersectional positionality of
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interviewers, and female interviewers as legitimacy was conferred on me by my
respondents because of my job in education whilst simultaneously being seen as
non-threatening and relatively powerless (see Pratt, 1993 and England, 1994).
Comments such as the following were typical in this respect
“You’ll understand the difficulties of getting on in a labour market like this
when you don’t quite fit in – I don’t always feel like employers know how to
handle my difference – different background, different skills and different
aspirations”
(Associate, European investment bank, London June 2015)
From these initial contacts, I used a process of snowballing to access other Chinese
migrants working in a range of financial institutions that were both Chinese and
internationally owned. In so doing, I was made aware of several online and ‘real
world’ social networks for Chinese financiers in London that were either education
based (e.g. alumni groups from Masters of Finance degrees at the London Business
School) or aimed at supporting Chinese migrants in their career development (e.g.
The Association of Chinese Financial Professionals in the UK). These organizations
were important in terms of recruiting research participants and reflected the
demography of Chinese born financiers working in London with most interview
respondents aged under thirty-five. Interviews lasted between thirty minutes and
two and a half hours, were conducted in English and were recorded and transcribed
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for subsequent analysis within a grounded theory framework. Details of my
interviewees are provided in Table 1.
[Table 1 here]
Placing elite Chinese financial migration in London
Figures from the Office for National Statistics point to a small but rapid growth of
Chinese migration to the UK, and Chinese migrants working in financial services in
London in particular. For example, the proportion of Chinese migrants working in all
sectors across the UK remains small, estimated officially to be 0.72% of the
population of England (379,503). Within this, London has the largest number of
Chinese migrants (124,250 or 1.52% of the population, although estimates of
undocumented Chinese migrants suggest the figure is closer to 300,000 (Knowles,
2015). Indeed, in 2014, more migrants arrived in the UK from China than from any
other country (more than 40,000), and yet they remain one of the least studied
migrant groups (Knowles, 2015). Further corroborating this upward trend in Chinese
migration to the UK, reports from the executive search sector point to the significant
increase in the number of mandarin speakers working in and demanded by London’s
financial services sector (Mandarin here being significant as it has become
increasingly important relative to Cantonese that typified earlier waves of Chinese
migration from Hong Kong) (Astbury Marsden, 2014).
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New national insurance registrations allow us to be more specific in terms of
charting the growth of Chinese migrants working in London from 2011-12 onwards
increasing from 2830 new NI registrations in 2011-12 to 4404 registrations in 2015-
16, an increase of twenty-two per cent (see Figure 1). The timing of this increase fits
with London’s growing role in RMB internationalisation from 2011 onwards and it is
therefore likely that employment in financial and related professional services
accounts for at least part of this increase. There is also a geography to NI
registrations of Chinese migrants working in London. As Figure 1 shows, the
boroughs showing the largest percentage increase in annual NI registrations for
Chinese migrants between 2002-3 and 2015-16 are Camden (438%), Westminster
(406%), Kensington and Chelsea (332%), Hammersmith and Fulham (246%) and the
City of London (220%). These boroughs are typified by their clustering of young
urban professionals (Thrift and Leyshon 1992), echoing the age demographic of elite
Chinese financiers working in London as well as the global super rich (Atkinson et al
2017). The significant increases in the City of London and Tower Hamlets (126%) are
particularly important for the purposes of the arguments in this paper since these
are the boroughs associated with financial services activity and therefore provide an
indication that these migrants are working in financial and related professional
services.
[Figure 1 here]
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In addition to focusing on individual migrants, the impact of Chinese elite mobility to
London working in financial services on London’s urban form is also revealed by
focusing on the location of Chinese financial firms operating in London. Previous
research has clearly documented how waves of internationalisation have shaped
both the working practices and associated urban form of London’s financial district.
This process is characterised by the expansion of international financial service firms
from the historic centre of London’s financial district close to the Bank of England
(Pryke, 1991) eastwards to Canary Wharf (Daniels and Bobe, 1992), northwards and
westwards in the case of hedge funds, asset managers and private wealth managers
(Hall, 2017c).
Chinese financial services have not followed this trend of outwards geographical
expansion beyond the historic centre of London’s financial district. Indeed, figure 2
shows that Chinese financial and related professional services are currently clustered
closely around the Bank of England. The case of Chinese state owned commercial
banks illustrates the preferences for these financial institutions to locate within the
City of London most clearly.
[Figure 2 here]
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In terms of bank internationalisation, the rapid and recent growth of London as a
leading offshore RMB centre is reflected in the opening of branches by all four of
China’s biggest commercial banks in London from 2014 onwards (see table 2). Prior
to 2013, Chinese commercial state owned banks could not open branches in London
because, in common with other non-EU financial institutions, Chinese banks could
only establish subsidiaries rather than full branches in the UK. This reflected the
cautious attitude of financial regulators in London to overseas banks in the fallout
from the 2007-8 financial crisis (Ying, 2013). Bank subsidiaries were seen to pose
less of a risk to systemic financial stability, because they had higher capital and
liquidity requirements. The commitment to allowing Chinese banks in the UK to
open branches was formalised in October 2013 at the Fifth UK-China Economic and
Financial dialogue held in Beijing between the Chinese Vice Premier Ma Kai and the
UK’s Chancellor of the Exchequer George Osborne.1 The first Chinese bank to be
given such a licence was Industrial and Commercial Bank of China, which obtained its
full UK banking licence in London at the end of 2014 and has been closely followed
by the other big four state owned banks (see table 2). The clustering of these banks
around the Bank of England reflects their location in Beijing, where being close to
the regulator, in this case the People’s Bank of China (PBoC), is seen as being central
to the learning of key market developments that will shape their organisational
strategy and operations. As one banker observed:
1 Economic and Financial Dialogues have been held between monetary and finance
ministers in UK and China since 2008 and typically include announcements
concerning significant regulatory changes aimed at developing London’s role within
RMB internationalization.
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“You can draw a very tight circle around the Bank of England if you join the
dots between all the Chinese offices in the City [of London]. And that is very
Chinese – to be located as close as possible to the regulator”
(Trader, Chinese bank, Chinese national, London, March 2015)
[insert table 2 here]
The clustering of Chinese professional service firms around the Bank of England is
not limited to financial services. In the case of law, the growth of Chinese law firms
has been dominated by mergers and joint operations between multinational law
firms seeking to access the Chinese market and offer advice to Chinese clients
seeking to invest outside of China, and their Chinese counterparts. For example,
Baker & McKenzie, headquartered in Chicago, has developed a joint operation with
the Chinese firm FenXun Partners. This allows Baker & McKenzie to access lawyers
practising Chinese law which can only be undertaken by Chinese law firms.
Responding to the growing demand from Chinese firms seeking to invest in the UK,
the first wholly owned Chinese law firm was established in London in 2015 (Fortado,
2015). As Figure 2 shows, YangTse Law located close to London’s financial district,
reflecting the close relationship between financiers and lawyers when advising on
investment into the UK.
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Taken together, data on recent Chinese migration to London and the mobility of
financial and related professional services firms into London provides an important
first step in documenting the hitherto neglected growing significance of Chinese
finance in London’s financial district. However, in order to understand the rationale
behind these urban geographies, in depth qualitative research is needed with
Chinese migrants.
Understanding the motivations, experiences and trajectories of elite Chinese
migration into London
Chinese finance in London is underpinned by two relatively distinct groups of elite
Chinese financiers with different migration motivations, experiences and
trajectories: first early career financiers building on their higher education
credentials acquired in the UK; and second; financiers working on secondment from
mainland China within Chinese commercial banks.
Educational routes into elite Chinese financial labour markets
The first group of elite Chinese financiers working in London’s financial district are
early career financiers who have stayed to work following completion of
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undergraduate or postgraduate degrees in the UK. As such, this groups builds on the
more well studied mobility of Chinese higher education students to the UK (Brooks
and Waters, 2011). Indeed, China sent the largest number of overseas non-EU
students to UK higher education institutions in 2015-16 (the last year for which data
is currently available, HESA, 2017). In common with the historic relationship
between educational background and entry into elite financial labour markets (Jones
1998), Chinese financiers strategise carefully about the institution they attended and
the degree programme they studied, aiming for Oxford, Cambridge or another
research-intensive Russell Group university, with a preference for quantitative based
degree subjects, often in economics, mathematics, engineering or business studies.
This reflects the ways in which these universities were seen as being able to confer
the social and cultural capital needed to secure employment in London’s financial
district, as the following example demonstrates:
“My parents had made it clear that travelling to the UK was a good idea,
particularly as it would allow me to work in finance in London. But I had to go
to a top ranked University to get the maximum benefit. So I studied
economics at Warwick and every summer, applied for internships in London.
I followed this with a Masters degree and hoped to use that and my work
experience as a way of getting a finance job”
(Associate, European investment bank, London, February 2015)
21
However, at another level, the case of Chinese migrants’ educational routes into
financial services work in London departs from established understandings of the
relationship between educational background and financial services work in London
that have, historically at least, often pointed to a relatively seamless transition from
educational attainment at elite universities to employment in financial services
(Augar, 2001). Rather, the experiences of young Chinese migrants reveal the
challenges of converting highly valued educational credentials from UK universities
into a career in financial services in London because of the continued lack of ethnic
diversity within elite financial labour markets (see British Bankers Association, 2015
on the case of banking and Johanson and Vahlne 2009 for a broader discussion of
‘otherness’ within organisations). Indeed, progressing from university to a graduate
level position in financial services, particularly in commercial financial services, was
the exception rather than the norm amongst the individuals I interviewed. Different
strategies were adopted to overcome this. Some graduates took a first position in
retail banking, often in a back-office function in a provincial financial centre in which
they had studied such as Birmingham or Edinburgh. For example, one banker
reflected that
“After my degree [first class economics degree from Birmingham], I applied
to all the usual financial houses for their graduate schemes but received no
offers. I think it was partly due to concerns about my English for writing
reports. That was upsetting as my dream [of using UK education as a point of
entry into financial services in the UK] had gone. So, I ended up taking a
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back-office job in Bank of China in Birmingham. It wasn’t really what I wanted
to do and wasn’t very challenging but after two years I moved to their
London operations and then moved from retail into their commercial
operations.”
(Associate, European asset management, London, March 2015)
Even when Chinese migrants were employed in international banking brands, they
were often located in parts of the labour market in which skills stereotypically
associated with Chinese migrants were valued. Stereotypes based on ethnicity that
assumed that Chinese migrants were quantitative financiers led to them being
effectively limited to work in back office analytical roles, particularly if they sought to
leave Chinese owned financial institutions and work for American or European firms,
as the following banker reflected:
“On paper, I have the perfect CV – a first [class degree] from Oxford and a
masters in finance from London Business School. I started working for a
Chinese bank but could only get hired here [a European bank] through a
personal contact and even then, I’m stuck doing analytical work … my social
networks and interests don’t fit so well with the organization and I’m only
being sponsored by another Chinese employee. I feel like they know I’m
good at numbers but don’t really look beyond that”
(Analyst, European investment bank, London, March 2015)
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Despite this separation, Chinese financial migrants were eager to use their
experience as a stepping stone onto further mobility, often expressing a desire to
gain international experience whilst they essentially waited for China’s financial
centres to develop in ways in which they could then bring their international
experience to bear:
I see London as part of my career but no more than that. I’m getting the
experience I need here but will ultimately use that in another financial
centre, possibly Singapore or maybe Beijing or Singapore when their financial
systems are more mature. There I would be closer to home but still working
in an exciting centre.
(Analyst, UK bank, London, March 2015
This discussion reveals how Chinese financiers working in London are typically at a
much earlier career stage than many of the financial migrants and expatriates
studied in existing work on financial elites (Beaverstock, 2004). As such, their career
mobility is much more closely linked to their higher education choices, with their
educational decision-making often explicitly linked to their financial career
aspirations. However, their experiences of trying to secure employment within
London’s financial district reveals the challenge of trying to overcome the continued
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lack of ethnic diversity in elite financial labour markets to use the geographical
career mobility of working in London as a way of advancing their careers by working
in a leading IFC.
Secondments from China in London’s financial labour market
The second group of Chinese migrants working in London’s financial district are more
senior bankers on secondment from mainland China. The financial institutions
involved in this process are Chinese state owned commercial banks. Whilst
‘individual [Chinese] banks vary on their approach to staffing’ (Vice president,
Chinese state-owned bank, London February 2015), senior positions within these
banks are typically filled through secondments from the Chinese head office with
banks ‘not using the tier two visa for their own staff’ (Head of China Desk,
investment bank, London, April 2015). These individuals perform the role of
‘diplomat managers’ seeking to secure personal career advancement through
leading the implementation of regulations and expectations from Beijing, rather
than focusing on market making in London. As one Chinese national banker in a
Chinese state owned bank observed in June 2015 “I was head of the China desk and
there were eight of us in a meeting and all of us were Chinese and none of us were
recruited externally”. A secondment typically lasts five years and this sets the time
horizon within which these managers make decisions. As a result, a risk averse
approach to business development predominates over stimulating market demand
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and establishing Chinese banks as legitimate service providers within London. This is
because the incentive structure for these individuals prioritises work on the strategic
internationalisation of Chinese banks, rather than developing links between these
institutions and their international counterparts in London. Comments such as the
following were typical amongst the Chinese bankers I interviewed:
“Managers are here for around five years and that means they essentially act
as diplomats rather than businessmen [sic]. They are more focussed on not
messing up and making mistakes rather than the longer-term strategy of
bank internationalisation.”
(Trader Chinese bank, Chinese bank, London, February 2015)
Recent work on the internationalisation of transnational service firms has
increasingly demonstrated that corporate internationalisation relies not only on
responding to client demand in new geographical markets, or following existing
clients about new markets but instead focuses on stimulating demand by educating
potential new customers into the value of using their services through a range of
activities (see Suddaby and Viale, 2011). The reliance on expatriation within these
banks in London, and the limited ability to make markets through stimulating client
demand associated with this, limits the ability of Chinese banks to grow their client
and product base beyond its extant focus on supporting Chinese small and medium
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sized enterprises operating in London (City of London, 2015). As one financial
journalist summarised in London in February 2015:
“Chinese banks should be able to create more products to get more clients.
They need to face up to becoming a local bank, it is survival. It is a no brainer
even to think about your [a Chinese bank] localisation strategy. So, the end
of internationalization is localisation, how to become a local bank.”
The limited ability of Chinese banks to make markets in this way is significant not
only in terms of the career biographies of bankers working within them, but also in
terms of the wider position of London within RMB internationalisation, revealing the
on-going challenges of sustaining and developing London as an offshore RMB centre,
as the following example demonstrates:
“I think that has put them [Chinese banks] in a vulnerable position when they
are here in an international market. … I’m feeling there is a gap between
what the British Government wants them to do and what the Chinese banks
can do in the market.”
(Capital markets lawyer, UK national, London March 2015)
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This form of expatriation therefore differs in important ways from more well studied
forms of expatriation out of Europe and North America. The rationale is driven not
by a desire to either create new market demand or to spread corporate best practice
into a new geographical market (on which see Faulconbridge et al, 2009) but rather
is closely entwined with political aspirations in Beijing aimed at developing London
as a key node in the emerging RMB internationalisation network of IFCs (see also
Hall, 2017a). Taken together, these different forms of elite migration show how elite
mobility combines economic and political imperatives such that individual mobility
patterns and practices are shot through with macro scale political and economic
concerns. This finding is important because it offers a sympathetic critique of the
existing literature on elite migration that typically emphasises the economic and
personal motivations and experiences mobility, with less attention paid to the
political dimensions.
Conclusions
In this paper, I have used the case of elite Chinese financial migration and
expatriation to London’s financial district to argue that comparatively neglected
forms of elite financial mobility from beyond the Global North provide important
insights into the changing geographical form and labour market practices within
leading international financial centres. The main empirical contribution of the paper
is to provide one of the first analyses to specify the nature of elite Chinese financial
28
migration to London and locate this within calls to better understand the marked
recent changes in Chinese migration to London more generally (Knowles 2017). This
is important because research has typically focused on lower skilled Chinese
migration to London. As a result, the implications of the significant numbers of
Chinese students studying at UK universities who are seeking graduate level
employment in sectors such as finance and related professional services for elite
labour markets and economic development within London (as revealed in this paper)
and the rest of the UK remain poorly understood.
Whilst these findings have been developed through the unique case of elite Chinese
migration into London, this research also contributes to wider agendas concerned
with decentring understandings of the global economy (Robinson 2005) by
examining flows of elite mobility from rapidly developing economies beyond the
Global North. In terms of elite labour market mobility, two implications are
important. First, in common with earlier rounds of elite migration, Chinese migration
is shaping London’s urban form in important ways, not always following previous
rounds of urban development stemming from internationalization in London’s
financial district. Here I support calls to more fully explore the intersection between
mobility and cities, particularly in the case of Chinese mobility as this is playing an
important but comparatively overlooked role in the ongoing economic development
of London (Knowles, 2017). Second, elite Chinese financial migration to London
challenges assumptions about the nature of migrants themselves, particularly in
terms of their career stage and the rationales behind their mobility with personal
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career aspirations and political agendas from Beijing playing a more important role
than organizational strategy which often dominates in existing understandings of
elite migration and expatriation. Building on these findings is an important emerging
research agenda for social scientists concerned with urban economies and their
labour markets, particularly as migration becomes the subject of significant popular
and political debate in many parts of the world economy, not least, the UK.
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Table 1 Educational and career history of research participants (some details have
been redacted to ensure the anonymity of individuals. Source: author’s research)
Job title Educational background Current employer
Associate Undergraduate degree, China
Postgraduate degree, UK
European investment bank
Trader Undergraduate degree China Chinese bank
Associate Undergraduate degree China,
post graduate degree UK
European investment bank
Associate Undergraduate degree UK European asset management firm
Analyst Undergraduate degree China,
postgraduate degree UK
European investment bank
Analyst Undergraduate degree China,
postgraduate degree UK
UK bank
Analyst Under and post graduate degrees
in China
Chinese bank
Analyst Undergraduate degree China,
postgraduate degree UK
UK bank
Analyst Undergraduate degree China International finance organisation
Analyst Undergraduate and postgraduate
degrees in China
International finance organisation
Analyst Undergraduate degree China European investment bank
Analyst Undergraduate degree China European investment bank
Analyst Undergraduate degree China Chinese bank
Analyst Undergraduate and post graduate
degree
Chinese bank
Analyst Undergraduate degree China Chinese bank
Associate Undergraduate degree Hong
Kong
UK bank
Associate Under and post graduate degrees
UK
UK bank
Associate Undergraduate degree China,
post graduate degree UK
UK bank
Analyst Undergraduate degree China UK bank
Analyst Undergraduate degree UK European investment bank
Associate Undergraduate degree UK European investment bank
Associate Undergraduate degree China Organisation to support Chinese
finance professionals in London
Associate Undergraduate degree UK Organisation to support Chinese
finance in London
Analyst Undergraduate degree China Chinese bank
Associate Under and post graduate degrees
in the UK
European investment bank
Analyst Undergraduate degree China,
postgraduate degree UK
Boutique investment firm
Associate Undergraduate degree China,
postgraduate degree UK
Boutique investment firm
Corporate
lawyer
Undergraduate degree China,
postgraduate degree UK
International law firm
40
Corporate
lawyer, China
specialist
Undergraduate degree Hong
Kong, postgraduate degree UK
International law firm
Capital markets
lawyer
Undergraduate degree UK International law firm
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Figure 1
% increase in annual National Insurance registrations for Chinese nationals by
London Borough, 2002/3 – 2015/16.
Source: Department for work and pensions
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Figure 2 Location of main Chinese financial institutions operating in London
Source: Author’s research
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Table 2: Big four Chinese commercial state owned banks operating in London, by
tier 1 capital
Bank Date of
foundin
g in
China
Headquart
er location
Tier 1
capital
$m
World
Ranking
by tier 1
capital
(previou
s
ranking)
Summary
of
internation
al presence
Date
granted
UK bank
branch
license
Industrial
and
Commercia
l Bank of
China
1984 Beijing 207,61
4
1 (1) 400 overseas
branches in
39 countries
Septemb
er 2014
China
Constructio
n Bank
1954 Beijing 173,99
2
2 (5) 76 overseas
branches in
Germany,
Luxembourg,
Vietnam,
Sought Africa,
Australia, US,
South Korea,
Singapore,
Japan
January
2015
Bank of
China
1912 Beijing 149,72
9
7(9) 100 branches
in 36
countries
2015
Agricultura
l Bank of
China
1951 Beijing 137,41
0
9(10 Branches in
Hong Kong,
London,
Tokyo, New
York,
Frankfurt,
Sydney, Seoul
and Singapore
2015
Sources: The Banker, 2014 and bank annual reports
